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Chairman’s summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
he French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty have opened up a period of deep 
and protracted difficulties for the European Union. The strategic implications of the new 
situation are compounded by the fact that foreign and security policy was one of the areas in 
which significant innovations have been provided for by the treaty. 
In presenting his paper on the American perspective, Jeff Gedmin disputed the notion of a ‘crisis’ in 
the literal sense of the word, preferring the word ‘malaise’. He underscored the limited extent of 
‘Schadenfreude’ in Washington. According to him, there was now a good chance to move away, on 
both sides of the Atlantic, from moralising attitudes, to have a more dynamic debate on the future of 
Europe. The director of the Aspen Institute Berlin noted that the strategic glue between the US and 
Europe was not as readily provided as before by common values (but not ‘clone’ values) or common 
interests (we all have ‘sharper elbows’ and our interests don’t always coincide). But when addressing 
the question of transatlantic co-operation, his view was that it was necessary to think through the 
alternatives to sticking together. 
Timofei V. Bordachev, from the Institute of Europe, put forward the proposition, in his presentation, 
that the EU crisis means the end of a ‘normative empire’. While emphasising the absence of mutual 
trust in the EU-Russia relationship, he considered that the future of the European integration project 
cannot be abstracted from the form of co-operation with Russia, in effect a European-Russian future. 
He added, in response to the chairman’s question about the nature of the glue binding Russia and 
Europe, that the aim was to extend ‘peace in Eurasia’ in the same way that the EU’s goal had hitherto 
been ‘peace in Europe’.  
Charles Grant underlined the importance of interests in providing the glue between the US and the EU 
as between Russia and the EU. Pressed by the chairman on the issue of the ultimate limits of the 
European Union, the director of the Centre for European Reform defended the virtues of ambiguity 
within the context of existing treaty language (which mentions ‘Europe’ without defining it in 
geographical terms). Like Jeff Gedmin, he was wary of using the word ‘crisis’, which conveys the 
impression that European integration is essentially treaty-driven whereas recent examples (the 
Services Directive, the European Arrest Warrant) show otherwise. He considered that in the case of 
CFSP, political will is more important than institutions. In presenting the proposals made in his paper 
concerning variable geometry, he recalled the need to define those areas which would need to be 
common and not variable (e.g. trade, competitions, single market, fisheries, regional policy, elements 
of CAP, border control, environment). He added that his suggestion of “associate membership of 
CFSP” could include Russia. 
In setting the stage for the first round of discussion, Robert Cooper made several points. In his view, 
too much hubris had accompanied the Constitutional Treaty project, moving away from the 
methodology of Jean Monnet or, to use a British precedent, of Bagehot: We forgot to do things which 
are effective rather than dignified or decorative. He noted that there had indeed been little 
Schadenfreude in the US, but, rather more so in Russia, because of opposing views on enlargement 
(i.e. for Moscow, the less enlargement the better, for Washington the more the better). On the ultimate 
limits of Europe, he asked the rhetorical question if the Mediterranean or the Sahara was the limit of 
the EU to the South. On the issue of associate membership of CFSP, he stressed not only the limited 
appeal of such halfway-house solutions (countries want a seat at the table) but also the limited ability 
of a still weak CFSP to cope with such an approach (hence the ‘no’ to Norway’s ideas on this score).  
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In the first round of discussions, one participant noted that variable geometry would have occurred 
even with the Constitutional Treaty. And even those who want variable geometry need to explain who 
would define the areas that would not be subject to variable geometry. On a different note, the same 
person observed that ‘output legitimacy’ had reached its limits. He made the point that the arrest 
warrant had been struck down by the German constitutional court in part for reasons related to national 
sovereignty.  
A member of the Commission staff stressed, inter alia (as had Jeff Gedmin), that the smaller states 
had to be ‘brought along’ in the EU integration process. He also emphasised that CFSP had not been a 
contentious item in the French and Dutch referenda. His view was that there will be a need for a new 
treaty down the road if the EU wants to have an EU foreign minister. This point was underscored by a 
Dutch speaker, who asked how the EU could deal with Asia if the ‘malaise’ is unresolved. Another 
participant raised the risk of ‘protectionist groupings’ arising in the case of variable geometry while a 
member of CEPS noted that enlargement would be slowed down without a treaty. 
In response, Charles Grant raised the issue of eventual extension of the EU’s ‘enlargement leverage’ 
as far afield as North Africa or Russia or Kazakhstan. He agreed that the Constitutional Treaty should 
be considered as dead. He suggested that the existing treaties could provide the basis for deciding what 
would not be eligible for variable geometry. 
Robert Cooper noted that one would indeed need a Constitutional Treaty to have an EU foreign 
minister. He noted that, although it is possible in theory to create the service d’action extérieur (SAE) 
without a treaty, one would still have to decide to whom the SAE would report, which brings one back 
to the foreign minister. The Croatian Accession Treaty could possibly be used to incorporate elements 
of CFSP-related language. 
He reminded participants of the recent speech given by the Belgian foreign minister in Florence, 
observing that not every EU country would be interested in every CFSP issue. On the issue of the 
EU’s limits, he considered that this was a divisive debate whose time had not yet come. 
Timofei Bordachev took the view that the EU crisis had really started in 1997, when variable 
geometry was introduced and that variable geometry kills solidarity.  
In the second round of discussions, Russian participants pointed out that the EU-Russia Partnership 
and Co-operation Agreement would expire in 2007. A member of CEPS took exception to the idea 
that the EU had ceased to be a ‘normative empire’, noting that Russia lay outside the EU’s system of 
norms and values. 
On the issue of the EU’s limits, one participant observed that the French départments in Algeria had 
been covered by the original treaties in the 1950s, while Cyprus had been included in the Council of 
Europe at the same time, thus reminding us of the many meanings which could be given to the word 
‘Europe’… 
A Finnish participant noted that the EU had made substantial progress in the field of defence, citing 
the creation of battle groups and the European Defence Agency. He wondered where this would lead 
us in the next 20 years. A Japanese speaker suggested that the real crises were budgetary or political 
(e.g. the leadership conflict between Mr. Blair and M.  Chirac) rather than constitutional. Cherry-
picking could deal with the latter. 
A Canadian participant also took the view that the incremental progress on European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) and JLS, combined with the inevitable leadership changes in Paris and 
London, could get the EU beyond the current malaise. He added that with the accession of Croatia, the 
Nice Treaty would become obsolete in terms of its voting weight provisions. This could be an 
opportunity for broader change in the form of a new treaty. 
In response, Timofei Bordachev considered that the EU had not been a serious player with Russia, 
either before or after the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty. The latter had not changed things 
much from that standpoint. Russia was not getting as much leverage as it could in its relations with the CHAIRMAN’S SUMMING-UP | 3 
EU from its position in the field of energy, where its policy has essentially been one of a mere seller of 
oil and gas. 
Charles Grant did not concur with the view that “variable geometry kills solidarity”. In his view, the 
‘EU-3’ on Iran, the policy towards Ukraine and the Euro were all positive examples of solidarity. He 
agreed with the role of defence in helping the EU move forward. As to where defence convergence 
would be in 20  years, he foresaw common procurement, enhanced pooling of assets and the 
development of the EU’s military intervention capability. 
In conclusion, he observed that Russia’s values and attitudes were different from those of the EU, but 
noted that whereas Russia’s values could change, the sheer size of Russia would not, thus bringing us 
back to the question of the EU’s limits.   
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American and European Malaise? 
A European Perspective 
Jeffrey Gedmin* 
 think I first really grasped what ‘Schadenfreude’ means by living in Germany these past four 
years. I can think of countless examples, of course, but most recent and poignant, perhaps, was the 
column I came across in the newspaper Tageszeitung (taz). The writer actually took the view that 
it was a good thing that hurricane Katrina hit the United States (he felt “joy” in his heart). He added 
for good measure that it was a pity Katrina was not able target supporters of the American President 
and members of the US military (Philipp Mausshardt, 2 September 2005). 
This may be an example of anti-Americanism, but it also is in piece with the moral competition some 
European elites insist on promoting with the United States. Recall, for example, the overheated, 
sanctimonious rhetoric one heard for a time from European capitals over Kyoto. It seemed a touch 
unreasonable. The United Nations intergovernmental panel on Climate suggests says that, without 
ratification of Kyoto, the average global temperature will rise about 1 degree Celsius by 2050. The 
same group forecasts that with the implementation of Kyoto, the temperature will still rise 0.94 
degrees. As Italian defence minister Antonio Martino (himself an economist) has pointed out, that’s a 
whopping difference of 0.06 degrees a half century. Incidentally, a dozen European countries that 
signed Kyoto are slipping rapidly behind their treaty obligations today, a fact that does not seem to 
cause much huffing and puffing on opinion and editorial pages and talk shows in Europe. It is that 
eco-reactionary George W. Bush, maintains for example the Independent newspaper, who is the real 
“threat to the world”. 
What is the difference between US and European approaches to the Greater Middle East? You can 
find a candid and rather astonishing answer on the website of the German foreign ministry, says Dr. 
Gunter Muhlack, Commissioner for the Task Force for Dialogue with the Islamic World:  
We do not want to impose our view of the world and our philosophy on our partners. Here I have the 
feeling there is a big difference between the American and European approach. Europe is no longer 
interested in power games. The world we want to see is a world of lasting peace based on justice and 
the rule of law. 
This moral competition with America is nothing new, of course, and like anti-Americanism itself it 
has a long history and tradition. Barry Rubin notes that in the 1780s, a French lawyer named Simon 
Linguet, surely speaking for more than a few at the time, argued that America was being built by the 
dregs of Europe and would in due course become a dreadful society bent on the domination of the 
continent and the destruction of civilization. Nor is the attempt of European elites to caricature 
American presidents and US positions anything new. The current affairs magazine Der Spiegel 
insisted that we Americans want to have everything our own way in our own ‘McWorld’ in an 
editorial written during the glory days of that great and beloved multilateralist Bill Clinton. As for 
current American attitudes toward Greater Middle East by the way, President Bush’s view, in his own 
words, is that “when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that emerge may reflect 
customs and traditions very different from our own. American will not impose our form of 
government on others.” 
I wonder whether a touch of humility on both sides of the Atlantic will provide space for much over 
due reflection and introspection. I think we have an opportunity. The administration in Washington 
was beginning to realise well before the president’s re-election to a second term that the way in which 
the US had dealt with key allies in recent years was counter-productive, to put it mildly. This was one 
of the conclusions in a recent book by Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis titled “Surprise, Security, and 
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the American Experience,” a slender volume the president, his national security adviser and top NSC 
members were reading in summer 2004. The President had even invited Professor Gaddis to the White 
House for a discussion.  
Indeed, if the European reaction over Kyoto tended toward hysteria, Washington’s own management 
of the issue was defined by arrogance and incompetence. Likewise, American public diplomacy failed 
badly to explain American reservations about the International Criminal Court and, for that matter, 
pressing US concerns over Saddam’s Hussein’s quest to escape sanctions and continue his armament 
programmes. I have a feeling American hubris may fade, at least momentarily, and for this there are 
certainly other reasons as well.  
The mismanagement of hurricane Katrina was a disaster for the Bush administration. Social Security 
reform, which was to be a centre piece of the President’s second term, has foundered. Iraq continues to 
present enormous challenges. The president’s popularity has plummeted. The indictment of Vice 
President Cheney’s aide Scooter Libbey and the ongoing investigation of potential wrongdoing in the 
CIA leak case of the president’s top adviser Karl Rove have also badly damaged the administration. 
The ill-fated choice of Harriet Meiers for a seat on the Supreme Court was another recent blow to the 
President’s standing and prestige. 
At the same time, from an American perspective Europe looks hardly to be in the best of shape. You 
would be hard pressed to find much evidence of Schadenfreude in Washington. In Britain, Tony 
Blair’s power has begun to wane. In France, the nation-wide riots of recent weeks have begun to 
provoke a serious national debate, which will understandably devour enormous amounts of time and 
political capital in the months ahead. The American-led intervention in Iraq has damaged America’s 
standing in France. I wonder if our French friends fully appreciate how, in the US, the image of France 
has taken a beating as well. In October, a French magistrate brought former UN Ambassador Jean-
Bernard Merimee in for questioning on an allegation that he took a bribe from Saddam Hussein for 11 
million barrels of oil. Others accused in wrongdoing in the UN’s oil-for-food scandal thus far include: 
Charles Pasqua, a senator and former interior minister; Serge Boidevaix, the former secretary general 
of the Foreign Ministry; Patrick Maugein, chairman of the oil company SOCO, who is also close to 
Jacques Chirac. 
Germany has its own problems of course. We are still waiting for a new government. The Grand 
Coalition that is being formed will try to focus on economic reform, a process that is now certain to 
move forward at snail’s pace. With low growth, 11% unemployment (19% in Berlin), meagre defence 
spending, an ageing population, declining birth rates, does anyone really expect Germany - Europe’s 
largest economy - to be a force for action and a leader in Europe in the years to come? 
This is the backdrop to the collapse of the EU’s constitutional process. You do not have to be a Euro-
pessimist to see that Europe is likely to be stalled for the next couple of years. Further enlargement 
appears increasingly unlikely, deeper integration at the moment unthinkable. Charles Grant is right 
when  he wrote recently that the European Union is "neither dead nor dying".  There is reason to 
believe, though, that both the US and EU may tend now towards self-involvement, a regrettable and 
potentially dangerous scenario for the next couple of years. 
In the short-term Iran continues to pose a formidable challenge to the transatlantic community. 
Europeans whisper that military force will not halt the Mullahs’ drive for a nuclear weapon. The 
Americans make no secret of the fact that they believe diplomacy is doomed to fail. Both may be right. 
Meanwhile, Syria shows signs of meltdown. The future of Iraq still hangs in the balance. In East Asia, 
we must cope with proliferation and prepare for the coming unification of Korea. And of course, how 
we help manage the rise of a peaceful China over the years ahead is probably one of the most serious 
tasks the transatlantic community has to ponder. 
There has been a fair amount of commentary in Europe about Euro-scepticism and anti-Europeanism 
in the United States. This is part of a larger and largely phoney debate. There is broad consensus in the 
US in favour of a strong Europe. Even the dreaded neo-conservatives have called for years for greater 
defence spending and reform of European economies, measures that would make Europe stronger. A 6 | JEFFREY GEDMIN 
stronger Europe will be less envious and resentful of American power. Once the current imbalance of 
power is addressed, it may become easier to forge common strategies on a variety of security issues.  
How Europeans choose to organise themselves remains chiefly a European matter, even if we talking 
heads like to hector time to time from the bleachers. In truth, Americans have had, in this respect, 
concern about one thing, a concern shared on both sides of the aisle in Washington: that the new 
Europe, whatever its organisational arrangements, be Atlantic in orientation, inclusive toward the 
young democracies in central and Eastern Europe and open to helping the United States solve the 
global, strategic problems of the day. This seems like a reasonable proposition if there ever was one.  
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The Strategic Implications of the EU Malaise: 
Enlargement, Variable Geometry and 
a Stronger Neighbourhood Policy 
An American Perspective 
Charles Grant* 
he EU’s malaise in 2005 is the result of at least four problems: economic failure, institutional 
blockage, diminishing legitimacy and lack of leadership. The poor performance of the core 
euroland economies has made many people fearful of change, whether it comes in the form of 
new EU treaties or fresh rounds of enlargement. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty has left a 
cloud of uncertainty over the EU’s institutions. Partly as a consequence of those economic and 
institutional problems, the legitimacy of the EU has diminished among many sections of European 
public opinion. And finally, throughout its history the EU has never experienced such a striking lack 
of leadership. The Commission is weak, while most of the large member states have leaders who 
appear to care little about the fate of the European Union.  
This essay examines the strategic consequences of the EU’s malaise and, in particular, the threat to 
further EU enlargement. It suggests that an extension of the principle of ‘variable geometry’ could 
help to revive prospects for enlargement. And it proposes a form of associate membership for 
countries that have no hope of joining the EU. 
Ever since the 1970s, there has been a close link between ‘deepening’, the movement towards a more 
integrated Union, and ‘widening’, the enlargement of the Union. Political elites in core countries such 
as France have always been reluctant to ‘widen’ the EU, understanding that a larger Union would find 
it difficult to integrate. They feared that the British wanted enlargement in order to fulfil the 
Thatcherite dream of an EU that was little more than a glorified free trade area, with weaker 
institutions and a diminished sense of solidarity. A wider Europe, of course, would also reduce the 
influence of France, Germany and the Benelux countries. 
But despite these reservations, the EU has continued to enlarge – in 1981, 1986, 1995 and 2004. The 
French and others sceptical of enlargement, such as federalists, swallowed their reservations. They did 
so because they extracted a price. This amounted to a series of treaties that created a more integrated 
Europe – those negotiated in 1985, 1991, 1997, 2000 and finally the Constitutional Treaty, signed in 
2004 but unlikely to ever enter into force. The British, Nordics and some other enthusiasts for 
enlargement were never particularly keen on treaty-based integration, but put up with it in return for 
enlargement. (The Germans sat in the middle of this debate, pro-deepening, because of their generally 
federalist approach to the EU, but also pro-widening, so that their neighbours could join the club.) 
This implicit bargain between deepeners and wideners has driven the EU forward for the past 20 
years. The demise of the Constitutional Treaty has therefore done much more than bring an end to 
treaty-based integration for the foreseeable future. It has also created major obstacles to further 
enlargement of the EU.  
Appetite for enlargement was deteriorating even before the French and Dutch referendums. France had 
changed its Constitution in March 2005 such that any country wishing to join after Bulgaria, Romania 
and Croatia could not do so without a positive referendum in France. Indeed one reason why French 
people voted ‘No’ to the Constitutional Treaty was to protest against the 2004 enlargement, which had 
been unpopular in France. In both France and the Netherlands some of those voting ‘No’ did so 
because they opposed Turkish membership (although the treaty had nothing to do with Turkey).  
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Evidently, there are many reasons why people oppose further enlargement, in addition to an apparent 
wish to end deepening. Some voters fear that people from accession countries will steal their jobs 
while others do not want Muslim countries in the EU. But there is no doubt that the French and Dutch 
referendums have darkened the prospect of a much wider Europe. Since the referendums most of the 
serious contenders for the French presidency – including Nicolas Sarkozy, Dominique de Villepin and 
Laurent Fabius – have spoken out strongly against Turkish accession. So have Angela Merkel, 
Edmund Stoiber and other senior German Christian Democrats. Austrian leaders have been especially 
hostile to Turkey, almost vetoing the opening of accession talks in October 2005. In many EU 
countries, senior officials, politicians and pundits are arguing that the EU should not expand into the 
Balkans, Turkey or elsewhere until and unless it can strengthen its institutions. 
That argument is not unreasonable. Proponents of enlargement need to show that the EU’s policies and 
institutions could function effectively in a wider Union. Nevertheless, it would be a tragedy for the EU 
to postpone further enlargement indefinitely. The Union’s greatest success has been its ability to 
spread democracy, prosperity, security and stability across most of the continent. Of course, there has 
to be a geographical limit at some point – North African countries are not in Europe and so cannot 
join. But for the EU to define precisely its future borders for all time would have a disastrous impact 
on would-be members beyond those borders. 
If the EU ended talks with Turkey, the extreme nationalist and Islamist elements within Turkish 
politics and society would be strengthened. The impact of the EU shutting the door on the Western 
Balkans would be worse still. Would fragile constructions such as Bosnia and Macedonia hold 
together? Would Serbia ever be able to swallow the bitter pill of independence for Kosovo without the 
prospect of EU membership for itself? And if the EU said “never” to countries further afield, such as 
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia, how could it hope to influence their development? 
Can Variable Geometry Save Enlargement? 
Despite enlargement’s gloomy prospects, Europe’s leaders could, if determined, resuscitate the 
process. First, they should boost Europe’s economic growth. As long as millions of Europeans are 
unemployed, or fear for their jobs, they will naturally be reluctant to welcome new EU members and 
their workers. Second, EU leaders should lead, explaining to electorates that extending the single 
market and good governance across the continent enhances their prosperity and security. 
Third, politicians should work to revive the EU’s legitimacy in two ways. They should ensure that the 
EU focuses on policies and actions that appear relevant to citizens’ lives, such as encouraging 
educational exchanges, making it easier for people to live and work outside their home country, or 
helping to retrain those who lose from globalisation. And they should improve the way the institutions 
work, for example by giving national parliaments a bigger role in decision-making and by allowing the 
media into the Council of Ministers. Much can be done without changing the current treaties.  
This essay concerns itself not with these three points, but rather a fourth way of promoting the cause 
of enlargement. EU leaders should make better use of variable geometry, the idea that not every 
member state need take part in every EU policy area. Already, of course, some EU countries opt out of 
the euro, the Schengen agreement or EU defence policy. The current treaties allow groups of member 
states to move ahead in certain policy areas, under the so far unused ‘enhanced co-operation 
procedure’. An avant-garde group could also emerge independently of the EU institutions. Schengen 
started as an inter-governmental accord before being folded into the EU treaties. 
More variable geometry could help enlargement in three ways. 
•  If the countries that aspire to a ‘political union’ were able to build avant-gardes in certain policy 
areas, and thus revive a sense of forward motion, they would be less likely to oppose further 
widening of the Union. AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE | 9 
•  EU governments should also try to persuade EU applicants to accept long or possibly indefinite 
transition periods that would postpone their full participation in some EU policies. Again, that 
would make enlargement more palatable for some doubters. 
•  For neighbours of the EU that are unlikely to join in the foreseeable future, the EU should offer a 
tighter form of association than its current neighbourhood policy. The EU should hold out the 
possibility of neighbours being able to join the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as 
‘security partners’. Such a scheme, if successful, could reduce the number of countries seeking full 
membership. 
Greater Use of Avant-Garde Groups 
The current trend towards variable geometry is unmistakeable. For example, seven member states 
signed the Treaty of Prüm in May 2005, a kind of ‘super-Schengen’ agreement that among other 
things enables the signatories to share information on fingerprints and DNA, and to co-operate on 
aircraft security. More informally, the interior ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, 
the so-called ‘G-5’, work together on counter-terrorism. And then there are issue-based sub-groups of 
members, such as that of Britain, France and Germany, the ‘EU-3’, which leads EU policy on Iran. All 
these groupings promote European interests or integration. In a wider, more diverse EU, it is inevitable 
that some countries will not take part in every policy area. This trend should be welcomed and not 
resisted. Any forum that has 25 or 27 governments represented around a table is seldom likely to be 
useful or effective. 
The variable geometry envisaged here is different to the idea of a ‘hard core’ or ‘concentric circles’ 
that is periodically floated by senior French politicians, including Jacques Chirac, Valérie Giscard 
d’Estaing and Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Their idea is that France and Germany should lead a group of 
integrationist members into a new organisation that would establish closer co-operation across a broad 
range of policy areas, rather than one particular area. Those left in the outer circle would be in the EU 
but not the new core. This scenario has never been very plausible because of the institutional, political 
and judicial difficulties that would ensue, and because few German leaders are amenable to the idea. It 
has become even less plausible in recent years because Franco-German leadership has gained a poor 
reputation among many other members and because of the weakness of the governments in Paris and 
Berlin.  
This essay suggests an alternative scenario, based on the current situation, in which several avant-
garde groups, each with a different membership, would overlap. 
Evidently, variable geometry – whether in the form of treaty-based enhanced co-operation clubs 
established outside the treaties or informal groups focused on particular policies – entails risks. 
However, most of the potential pitfalls can be dealt with. 
•  The danger of exclusion. The British government has traditionally opposed variable geometry, 
fearing that if it stayed out of a group it would lose influence in the EU and that if it later tried to 
join it might find the door bolted. Any avant-garde group is entitled to establish entry criteria for 
those who wish to join. But these criteria need to be interpreted in an objective manner to ensure a 
member state is not excluded for the wrong reasons. The Nice Treaty’s rules on enhanced co-
operation give the Commission just such a policing role. The countries that signed the Treaty of 
Prüm have said explicitly that, if their venture is a success, they will invite other member states to 
sign in 2008. The problem of exclusion is more pronounced for informal groupings. When the 
‘EU-3’ began their Iranian diplomacy, other member states resented being left out. However, the 
subsequent involvement of Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, who reports back to the 
other governments, has reassured most of them. 
•  Avant-garde groups could weaken EU institutions. Groups established outside the framework of 
the treaties, whether formal or informal, risk undermining the role of the Commission, Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice, to the extent that inter-governmental arrangements do not 10 | CHARLES GRANT 
involve EU institutions. But precautions can be taken to ensure that such groups mesh smoothly 
with the institutions. For example, when the Schengen agreement was established – initially, 
outside the EU treaties – the Commission was invited along as an observer. The signatories of the 
Treaty of Prüm have taken care to ensure that it is compatible with EU law. 
•  Variable geometry is ‘undemocratic’. That is true, to the extent that neither the European nor 
national parliaments have oversight of inter-governmental organisations. However, avant-garde 
groups are only as undemocratic as governments choose to make them. If a group of member 
states created an ‘enhanced co-operation’, the European Parliament would play a role (for normal 
Community business, the Parliament’s consent would be required, on foreign policy the 
Parliament would merely be informed and on Justice and Home Affairs it would be asked for an 
opinion). Other sorts of avant-garde grouping need not be unaccountable. Thus the president of 
the European Central Bank appears before the European Parliament’s monetary affairs committee. 
The Western European Union, a defence sub-group that has largely merged with the EU, still has 
its own parliamentary assembly, consisting of representatives from national parliaments. Other 
inter-governmental groupings could create their own systems of parliamentary oversight. 
•  Variable geometry could lead to the unravelling of the acquis communautaire. The more you 
allow some countries to pick and choose, the greater the risk that others will demand the right to 
opt out of existing policies they dislike. British Conservatives, for example, talk of using variable 
geometry to pull Britain out of the common farm, fisheries and foreign policies. The EU therefore 
needs to define the set of policies that every member must take part in. This should include trade, 
competition, the single market and its four freedoms (of goods, services, capital and people), 
fisheries, regional policy, overseas aid, some common rules on agriculture, some environmental 
rules, some co-operation on borders and policing, and a common foreign policy. That leaves 
subjects such as the euro, the co-ordination of budgetary and tax policy, border controls, the 
harmonisation of criminal justice and defence policy as suitable for variable geometry. 
The countries in the euro may well see virtue in co-ordinating their economic policies more closely. 
They are already talking of harmonising corporate tax bases (though not rates). They may wish to 
create a stronger external representation for the eurozone. Jean Pisani-Ferry, of the Bruegel think tank, 
has suggested that there is a much stronger case for eurozone members to co-ordinate their structural 
reforms than there is for the wider EU membership to do so. At some point the euro countries may 
even wish to simplify and strengthen the currently ragged rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The other area where more variable geometry is likely is in the domain of justice and home affairs. 
The Schengen agreement was a successful piece of variable geometry, conceived outside the treaties 
but later shifted into them. The recent treaty of Prüm suggests that more variable geometry is on the 
way, as do the ‘G-5’ meetings of interior ministers. 
Transitional Arrangements 
When a country joins the EU, it is normally subject to ‘transitional arrangements’ that exclude it from 
full participation from certain policies for a number of years. Sometimes these work to the benefit of 
the new member. East Europeans who joined the EU in 2004 will not have to apply all the (very 
costly) environmental rules for up to seven years. Sometimes the transitional arrangements work, 
supposedly, in the interests of the old members. Thus 22 of the old member states have insisted on 
limiting the right to work of citizens from the new member states for seven years. 
Most applicants naturally resist that kind of measure, resenting the implication of a status that is 
‘membership minus’. However, some applicants and future applicants should think very seriously 
about tolerating some long or even indefinite transitional periods. The biggest reason why many 
people fear Turkish membership is that they fear its workers will take their jobs. Free movement of 
labour would be good for Turkey and in most respects good for the existing member states. But given 
Turkey’s current poverty – with per capita GDP at around 30% of the EU average – fears of Turkish 
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example, allow a member state to limit inflows of Turkish labour indefinitely, but only for as long as 
Turkey’s per capita GDP was below 50 per cent of the EU average.  
Once Turkey had been in the Union for a few years, many member states would probably not wish to 
apply such restrictions. After all, the Turkey that joins the EU, if it does, will be very different from, 
and much richer than, the Turkey of today. Some Turks would see membership with limits on free 
movement of labour as an insult. But Turkish negotiators should, as a last resort, be prepared to accept 
such limits. Turkey would be much better off inside the EU, with restrictions, than outside. This would 
be a kind of variable geometry, in the sense that not every member would be taking part in every 
policy. Like the other kinds, it should make enlargement less threatening to those who fear it. 
Associate Membership of the CFSP 
Turkey and Croatia have started accession negotiations. Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Albania are 
likely to start negotiations at some point. If Montenegro and Kosovo become independent, they too 
will probably become candidates. Such countries are currently far from being ready for membership. 
However, if these Balkan states make good progress, and if they can convince the French electorate 
that their people share European values, they may be able to join the EU in the long run. 
But there are other countries, further afield, that have very little prospect of joining. Ukraine, a large 
country with a lot of farmers, has enhanced its democratic credentials over the past year. But apart 
from Poland and Lithuania, very few member states are keen to see it join the Union. Belarus and 
Moldova are unquestionably in Europe, but are very far from meeting the basic conditions for 
membership. Georgia believes itself in Europe, as do its neighbours Armenia and Azerbaijan, though 
many Europeans would disagree. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia has undergone a quasi-
democratic revolution and is keen to move closer to the EU. 
Over the past two years the EU has started to implement a new European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), which aims to enhance ties with the countries that have no prospect of joining in the 
foreseeable future. The point of the policy is to turn the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, the 
South Caucasus, and the EU’s eastern hinterland into a ‘ring of friends’. The EU has already 
negotiated country-specific or tailored ‘action plans’ with Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Palestine, Tunisia, 
Jordan and Morocco. Others, such as the three Caucasus countries plus Egypt and Libya are now 
starting to negotiate action plans. Each plan sets out the reforms the neighbour intends to undertake to 
align its economic and political system with European norms. It also sets out what the EU can offer in 
terms of trade, aid, political contacts and participation in its programmes. 
The neighbourhood policy is a sensible initiative and it is too soon to judge its effectiveness. But the 
EU seems to be having difficulty in fleshing out the promises that it has made in the action plans. 
Several Commission directorates-general have moved too slowly to deliver on commitments made 
under the ENP (DG External Relations being an exception). And many of the member states appear 
unenthusiastic. Some of those most hostile to enlargement are in no hurry to deepen ties with countries 
just beyond the EU’s borders. For their part, the neighbours have moved very slowly to fulfil their 
promises.  
In time, hopefully, both the EU and its neighbours will make a real effort to implement the action 
plans. But even if they do, a more fundamental problem will remain. Most of the neighbours believe 
that the neighbourhood policy does not go far enough in offering to integrate them with the EU. 
Nothing in the policy or the action plans mentions the possibility of the neighbours ultimately joining 
the EU. This limits the EU’s ability to influence its neighbours. The EU probably needs to offer juicier 
carrots in order to wield meaningful influence. It should therefore beef up the ENP by rewarding the 
best-performing neighbours with ‘security partnerships’ – in effect, much closer ties to the CFSP. 
This author owes this idea to a conversation with Salome Zurabashvili, the former Georgian foreign 
minister. She said that while Georgia was not yet ready for the rigours of the single market, it would 
benefit hugely from being part of EU foreign policy. As far as she was concerned, Georgian 
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She is right that the neighbours should not try to adopt most of the acquis communautaire. Their 
economies are too backward to thrive in the single market and their administrative systems are not 
capable of enforcing the EU’s 80,000 page rule-book. However, the neighbours could adopt the 
foreign policy acquis, which is mostly declarations rather than legislation, without much difficulty. 
Adopting policies is much easier than enacting laws – both technically and politically. Candidate 
countries often find the implementation of EU law very politically painful. But aligning a country’s 
foreign policy with that of the EU is seldom so sensitive. 
The European Economic Area could offer a kind of analogy for neighbours becoming ‘security 
partners’ of the EU. In the EEA, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are consulted on the shaping of 
single market rules but cannot take part in the formal decision-taking. When the EU takes a decision, 
the EEA countries have to accept it. But while the EEA is about economics, and has no bearing on 
foreign policy, the proposed security partnerships would work the other way round. These partners 
would engage in the CSFP but not in the single market. 
Suppose that Georgia and Ukraine make good progress with reform, and the EU asks them to become 
security partners. How might this work? The EU governments and those of Georgia and Ukraine 
would agree that they had common interests on certain subjects. The security partners would then join 
in discussions on those issues. But while they would help to shape EU policy, they would not take part 
in decision-making. When the EU decided on a common policy, the associates would have the right to 
sign up to it (opting in) or not. Each partner would have a small team of diplomats in the Council of 
Ministers’ Justus Lipsius building, sending representatives to the relevant committees and working 
groups. The partner would also send a senior diplomat to attend and speak at the Political and Security 
Committee when the subjects covered by the security partnership were discussed.  
Under such arrangements, the security partners would be more intimately involved in the CFSP’s 
institutions than are current candidate countries such as Croatia and Turkey (Bulgaria and Romania, 
having signed accession treaties, are allowed to take part in EU meetings). Candidates have the right to 
associate themselves with EU foreign policy, but they do not have diplomats in the CFSP machinery. 
Therefore the concept of security partnerships could not work unless candidates for full membership 
were included in discussions on foreign policy (that, in itself, could have a positive impact on the EU’s 
accession talks with these countries). 
Security partnerships should not be just about procedures and institutions. The point should be for the 
EU and its partners to help each other to deal with real problems. The flow of benefits should not be 
just one way, from the EU to the partners, but in both directions. For example, some neighbours could 
help the EU to stabilise some of the very problematic regions that adjoin them. 
Suitable areas for co-operation between the EU and its security partners could be, for example, the 
Caucasus, the Balkans, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and the Middle East Peace Process. The 
partnership should also extend to the European Security and Defence Policy. Already, some countries 
in the ENP send troops on EU military missions, but their involvement should be extended. Security 
partners should be encouraged not only to send troops and other essential personnel on ESDP 
operations, but also to take part in their management. 
This kind of link to the EU would probably have a beneficial impact on the neighbours concerned. 
Their diplomats would learn how the EU made policy. Their governments would be acclimatised to 
European ways of working. The model proposed is very different to the NATO-Russia council, which 
treats the NATO countries and Russia as two distinct entities. In contrast, this idea would aim to 
integrate neighbours into EU foreign policy as a way of bringing them closer to the EU more 
generally. 
There is a risk that the arrival of security partners in the Council of Ministers would make the EU’s 
diplomatic machinery more complicated and slow it down. Therefore it would be wise for the EU and 
its partners to start off by working together on only a limited range of issues. And if the EU did find 
the involvement of partners overly burdensome, it would have the right to press ahead and decide its 
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presence was merely symbolic, they could pull out of discussions on a particular subject. Or they 
could resign from their security partner status. 
One obvious criticism of this concept is that it would fail to deter neighbours from applying for 
membership. After all, Jacques Delors designed the EEA to prevent EFTA countries from seeking EU 
membership, but most of them did so anyway. However, faced with a choice between no membership 
and CFSP membership, some neighbours might prefer the latter. If a large group of member states 
suddenly started campaigning for full Ukrainian membership, the government in Kiev would of course 
have no incentive to pursue membership of the CFSP. But in the current climate that seems unlikely. 
In any case, the point of the proposed security partnerships is not to dissuade neighbours from 
applying to join the EU, but rather to encourage mutually beneficial co-operation. As with the action 
plans that exist under the ENP, the security partnerships should contain implicit conditionality. The 
partners that were most helpful to the EU could expect more economic and political dividends in their 
broader relationship with the EU. 
In the long run, if Russia becomes a truer democracy and a better respecter of civil liberties than it is 
today, the EU should consider offering it this kind of scheme. Some analysts will argue that member 
states such as Poland and Latvia would never agree to embrace Russia in such a way. But if at the 
same time the EU extended the same offer to countries such as Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan – 
assuming that political and economic freedom were firmly entrenched in those countries and in Russia 
– would Poles and Latvians really be so hostile? 
Other analysts will say that Russia is too proud to ever agree to be treated in the same way as Ukraine 
and Georgia. Today that is the case, but one may imagine that, at some point in the future, Russia 
might see that participation in a broader CFSP zone could help it to build friendly relations with its 
neighbours. In any case, the prize of involvement in EU policy-making would be attractive to many 
liberal Russians, who may one day be more influential than they are today. If the EU could extend its 
CFSP across the entire continent, its members, Russia and the countries between them would probably 
all get along better. 
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The Strategic Implications of the EU’s ‘Crisis’ 
‘Odd-Insider’ Perspective 
A Russian Perspective 
Timofei V. Bordachev* 
ussia is becoming more and more of an insider in European political and economic life, 
although there are no signs of its own ‘Europeanisation’, at least in the sense now generally 
accepted at the official level in the European Union. Russia and the European Union are linked 
by centuries of shared history, culture, tradition and economic interdependence. This interdependence 
cannot be destroyed even by today’s preoccupation (in Moscow and some European capitals) with oil 
and gas pipelines.  
The 70 years of the Communist experiment made an additional contribution to Russia’s 
‘Europeanisation’ by instilling in Russians a deep devotion to the idea of social solidarity and support 
for weak individuals by the state and society. In other words, contemporary Russian lifestyle is much 
closer to (old) French Orleans than to New Orleans. 
Irrespective of the real intentions of the official authorities and contrary to the tactical interests of part 
of the Russian business community, European standards and rules for regulating economic activities 
are becoming increasingly customary in this country. The well-being and stability of more and more 
Russian businesses are becoming dependent on decisions made by the Council of the European Union 
rather than by the Russian government. The ‘road maps’, approved by Russia and the EU at their May 
2005 summit, will also contribute to this process.
1 Even though their overarching goal – the 
establishment of an open and integrated market – will not be reached for some time, the fact that the 
guidelines exist will steer Russia, however slowly, towards the EU’s social and economic model. In 
terms of security policy, despite the fact that its internal situation can be considered as a challenge in 
itself, Russia shares with the EU the sense of facing a threat from transnational crime, unstable regions 
in the southern periphery of Eurasia and the potentially explosive (or aggressive) consequences of the 
transformation of some countries in the Far East.  
All these factors point to a Russia that has ceased to be only an external partner of the EU but a Russia 
that has already evolved into an ‘odd insider’ of European politics. It shares not only the same soil 
with the EU, but also most of the same fears and threats. This conclusion leads us to the following four 
observations to help us analyse the consequences of the current crisis in the EU both for the future of 
Europe as a whole and for Russia’s approach to European integration: 
1.  Russia is a European country that is now outside the European integration process; 
2.  the transformation of the European integration project and its final shape will be key in 
determining Russia’s place in the European space; 
3.  the transformation and viability of the European integration project cannot be dealt with in 
isolation from  EU-Russia co-operation and 
4.  the complexity of the situation and the recognition of the EU’s crisis at the highest political level 
mean that it is possible to move away from a  literal interpretation of the political documents 
adopted in recent years by the European Commission and the Russian government. In any case, 
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these documents have become part and parcel of the crisis of the EU’s foreign policy and its 
relations with Russia. Nothing in them is worthy of praise but it is too late to criticise them.  
Building on this analytical framework, it can be assumed that further enlargement and Russia’s 
inclusion in it in some form within 10 to 15 years will be among the major consequences of the EU’s 
crisis (which reached its peak in 2005). It can be assumed that, by the year 2020, Russia and other 
European countries, including current EU member states, will be able to closely co-ordinate the 
management of a considerable amount of their political and economic resources.   
The end of the ‘normative empire’? 
Some may say that statements like this are debateable and sound overly optimistic, at least today. 
However, even several months ago no one could have predicted that in the autumn of 2005 the 
European Union would be absorbed in heated debates about its own future, while its main 
supranational body, the European Commission, would be paralysed from being unable to exercise its 
own authority and to perform the functions of a supra-state actor in full.  
The machinery of European integration has quickly turned into an international community of political 
and economic actors torn between calls to “integrate further” (Brussels) and proposals to “divide 
according to interests” (London). The institutional crisis in the EU, which began in 1997 and which 
has now reached close to its peak, is most likely to run for another ten years. So now is precisely the 
time to think about the foundations for a Europe that will be built, in the foreseeable future, from the 
Atlantic to Vladivostok. 
Looking back, 2005 will be seen as the end of the European Union’s “widening and deepening” phase 
and as the beginning of a slow recovery, a return to the fundamentals of European integration. 
‘Enlargement’, a mechanical expansion of the EU’s ‘normative empire’ based on the introduction of 
more and more new exceptions, deepening the EU’s de facto division, has come to an end. It has 
culminated in the ‘New Neighbourhood’ programmes and the joint EU-Russia road maps.
2 
’Deepening’, the development of a purely regulatory function for ‘Brussels’, which has replaced the 
transfer of competences and which is also based on countless hidden exceptions, cannot work in its 
previous guise any longer either. This practice has resulted in attempts by the incumbent European 
Commission to overcome the division of the member countries into groups and to initiate 
macroeconomic changes. The year 2005 is not a time for decisions. It is rather a time for reflection. 
Three challenges 
An unbiased analysis of the events of the last decade shows that the EU has been heading towards 
crisis since 1997 and that the enlargement and the drafting of a Constitutional Treaty were attempts to 
prevent the crisis from getting worse. Both attempts failed to achieve the desired effect. Let us now 
consider in more detail the main elements of the European crisis, which are characteristic of both the 
situation inside the EU and of its relations with other European countries. 
First, there is a problem of trust from a substantial part of the population and elites in the EU countries 
and beyond towards the European integration process. The double failure of the ratification of the EU 
Constitution has changed public moods. The percentage of the Constitution’s opponents has increased 
even in countries that were once ardent supporters of it. The leaders of those countries initially 
declared that they would hold referenda on the Constitution. 
The mutual confidence between member countries and their citizens has fallen sharply. Internal 
solidarity within the EU has been undermined. Some of the ‘engines of European integration’ do not 
hesitate to conclude unilateral deals ‘on the side’, which trigger indignation, legally quite unfounded, 
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among the states of ‘New Europe’. The most recent accession of ten new member countries from 
central, eastern and southern Europe into the EU was an important factor in this respect as it has 
introduced a much greater degree of diversity to what had been a more or less uniform European 
Union in terms of social, political and economic development as well as mentality. Although the 
candidate countries were required to adhere to all ‘common policies’ and areas of integration 
unconditionally, their internal make-up (their attitude to sovereignty and the state, the quality of their 
political processes, the absence of a culture of compromise and hawkish foreign policies) mean that 
they were a far cry from the principles, rules and norms that had been developed in western Europe 
over decades. 
It has to be admitted that the majority of the new member states are not yet ready to conduct political 
dialogue in the language of western Europe. In this sense the ‘enlargement’, as an extrapolation of 
norms and rules that have been developed in ‘old’ Europe, has proven to be much less successful than 
expected. The enlargement has considerably increased the number of so-called small states within the 
EU but has not strengthened the supranational bodies, as these countries might have wanted. The 
legacy of the Communist period is still marked in some of the new EU members and this has 
influenced the general level of political culture in the Union. The EU has become less able, as a 
political body, to set and implement large-scale strategic tasks. Moreover, the conduct of some of the 
new member states, often unintentional and devoid of evil intent, has led to the revival of conservative 
rhetoric and aroused ‘demons of the past’ (nationalism) in some of the EU founder countries.
3 
Similar changes have taken place in relations between EU citizens and ‘Brussels’, i.e. the 
Commission. ‘Brussels’ which has never enjoyed much popularity, has found itself in an even more 
difficult and ambiguous position. The democratic shortfall with respect to the processes of European 
integration and the alienation of the supranational bureaucracy, centred in and personified by the 
European Commission, from ordinary EU citizens, have become even more glaring problems. The 
Commission’s ‘re-nationalisation’ and the adoption of the ‘one country, one commissioner’ principle 
have fuelled national egoisms. The integration process has proceeded smoothly only when major 
decisions are made in Brussels and when they are obediently endorsed by the political elites of the 
member countries. But after decision-making was entrusted to the citizens, the process stalled. 
Second, there is a crisis of the European institutions and the governability of the processes taking 
place in the EU’s political and economic space. The authority of the European Commission and its 
ability to perform political and technical functions have been called into question and seriously 
compromised in the last few years. Clearly setting down the Commission’s powers, as proposed in the 
Constitutional Treaty, was an attempt to overcome this consequence of the EU’s enlargement. At the 
same time, things must have gone too far and ‘Brussels’s’ attempt to safeguard its powers through the 
Constitution has produced the opposite result. 
There have been no formal changes in the division of powers. However, after the admission that the 
EU is “not in a crisis, but in a deep crisis
4”, the process of giving the Commission additional powers 
has slowed down markedly, even in areas where these powers are required to accomplish the tasks set 
by the EU member states. At the same time, there has been a certain redistribution of forces inside the 
European Union, between individual countries and supranational institutions, and between the EU 
Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission, headed by José Manuel Barroso, was a 
lame duck from the very beginning after it received several setbacks when commissioner nominees 
were being approved by the European Parliament. The political defeat suffered by Barroso in the 
European Parliament in October 2004 has undermined the Commission’s reputation. 
                                                      
3 Less than two weeks before the referendum in the Netherlands, public opinion polls showed a sharp increase in 
the number of the Constitution’s opponents. The increase took place after a Eurovision song contest where East 
European countries allegedly voted for each other, thus preventing singers from ‘old’ Europe from winning the 
contest. 
4 See statement of Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker on June 18
th: http://www.eu2005.lu/en/ 
actualites/communiques/2005/06/17jcl-pf/index.html. A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE | 17 
The crisis in the summer of 2005 has eroded the Commission’s authority still further and, at the same 
time, strengthened the European Parliament, the only supranational body in the European Union to be 
elected directly. However, the fact that the European Parliament does not have any real opportunities 
or the legal grounds to take charge of the situation may create a dangerous vacuum until such time as 
it can act as a pan-European source of political legitimacy. 
A recent meeting of the Council of the European Union, which discussed transport, 
telecommunications and energy issues, is a good example of this. It considered granting the 
Commission a ‘vertical’ mandate for negotiations with Russia and China in the field of air transport. 
The Commission had submitted the request in March 2005 when the office of Jacques Barrot, Vice-
President of the European Commission in charge of transport, made public an ambitious plan to create 
a common air space with these two partners.
5 The ministers of the 25 member states turned down the 
Commission’s proposal and said that relations with non-EU countries in the field of civil aviation 
would continue to be based on bilateral agreements. Moreover, the Council fixed the EU states’ right 
to conduct negotiations and conclude agreements with non-EU countries on their own. In addition to 
this, the Council demanded that the Commission seek a complete and unconditional abolition by 
Russia of trans-Siberian overflight payments now made by EU airlines. It emphasised that an 
unconditional fulfilment by Russia of this requirement was a “prerequisite for making further progress 
with the Russian Federation”.
6 The Commission was thus put in an exceptionally difficult position, 
and the only way out of it is to co-operate with the Russian government. 
The EU’s crisis of governability has largely resulted from the practice of making exceptions so that the 
enlargement process would go ahead despite the inability of a majority of the new member countries 
to meet all the membership requirements. The history of European integration has many examples of 
specially introduced exceptions, such as the Schengen system and the European Currency Union. 
Now, however, there are so many exceptions that they are starting to define the very nature of the EU: 
  The practice of exceptions was legally set in stone by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (Art. 11 – 
11a). 
  Never before have proposals to build a ‘Europe of exceptions’ been discussed as a possible 
scenario to preserve the viability of the entire European project. 
The latter refers to the theory of a ‘Europe of variable geometry’, which proposes formalising the 
possibility of member countries being able to establish closer associations according to their 
capabilities and wishes in order to keep the policy of ‘widening and deepening’ afloat. 
The issue of how viable this strategy could be for pan-European institutions and solidarity is 
hardly worth a serious discussion. But if the logic of establishing ‘clubs of interests’ should be 
continued, the freest possible association would be for the EU flag to be hoisted in front of 
official buildings, as is now done in Georgia. 
In general, the range of national priorities (in conducting economic policy - liberalising the market or, 
on the contrary, maintaining the emphasis on its maintaining high standards in terms of social 
conditions; in setting foreign policy priorities, and assessing threats) has grown much wider since the 
2004 enlargement than was expected. In terms of security, the lack of a shared vision and a ‘major’ 
threat has prompted some European countries to present their national agendas as pan-European ones. 
The European interest is, however, more than a simple sum of the national interests of EU member 
states. As a result, the benefits generated by the EU’s collective strength and capabilities have proven 
insufficient to compensate for the formal reduction of individual countries’ roles and delegation of 
sovereignties to the supranational level. 
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The EU’s inability to formulate a shared set of interests for the 25 member states has led to growing 
national egoisms and the formation of groups of countries with shared interests in domestic and 
foreign policies. This also refers to relations with Russia, where we can see at least three groups with 
different interests and different ideas of a rational approach – the alliance of France, Germany and 
Italy; the group of new member states and ‘Brussels’. The Commission’s report of February 2005 
provides an example of an artificial formulation of the European interest. The report proposed is both 
softer and tougher toward Moscow and its rulers. Subsequent analytical studies which followed up on 
the Commission’s initiatives, by that time already approved by the EU Council, proposed going over 
to the principles of almost open competition in relations with Russia, including on issues from the 
field of human rights and other humanitarian issues, however paradoxical this may sound.
7 
Another vivid example is a proposal to demonstrate ‘tough love’ (!) towards Russia, which can mean 
very different things to different people.
8 It seems that the ‘love’ was to emanate from Berlin and 
Paris, while the ‘toughness’ was to be displayed by Riga and Warsaw. The result is well-known. Such 
proof of the EU’s inability to work out a shared strategy with regard to a major European nation 
outside the EU is telltale evidence of the loss of governability within the entire European Union. 
Third, there is an obvious crisis in the strategic goals of the European integration project. If we set 
aside destructive proposals on reform of the EU, which can either turn it into a ‘gentleman’s club of 
interests’ or completely destroy the suprastate ‘supporting structure’ of the EU, the choice of proposed 
strategic goals will be limited as never before. The EU’s development into the most competitive 
economy in the world by 2010 would be quite an ambitious task that would go well beyond the task of 
preserving the social model that distinguishes Europe and the European way of life from the US and 
third world countries. The protection of ‘socially responsible’ Europe from Anglo-Saxon 
encroachments would also be a huge and hardly attractive task.  
The protection of human rights - from the threat of their being eroded under the banner of the struggle 
against the terrorist threat - would also hardly lay a good foundation for the political unity of the 
governments and citizens of the EU. Not all EU citizens are equally threatened by international 
terrorism and not all have the same vision of where the limits for the state’s interference in people’s 
private lives lie. A still worse foundation for European unity would be technical or economic tasks 
stemming from the EU’s increased ambitions on the international stage and its attempts to play the 
role of a global power. Initially, the main integrating factor was peaceful intentions based on benefits 
for each party. Substituting this policy with belligerence to the outside world would bring about a 
complete failure of political efforts. 
Reflected in Russia 
All three crises are fully reflected in the EU’s relations with its largest European partner – Russia. The 
crisis of confidence, or rather the complete absence of confidence, is almost openly admitted by 
politicians and officials on both sides.
9 There is evidence of a crisis of governability in the 
‘impressive’ rates of implementation of agreements and in the ‘enthusiasm’ of administrative bodies 
of Russia and the EU in this field. There are many people who can confirm what I said about a project 
for the establishment of a European college at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. 
The project was given the green light at the Russia-EU summit in the autumn of 2004 yet has never 
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9 See representative survey of Russian academics, business and officials taken during the brain-storming session 
in January this year. Late results of the brain-storming have been published as: Russia’s European Strategy: A 
New Start, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, July-September 2005; Russia - EU Relations: The Present Situation 
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made it further than the blueprint stage. The crisis in strategic goals is pretty self-evident as it is fully 
reflected in the unintelligible wording of the documents on the ‘four common spaces’. All the three 
difficulties in Russia-EU relations are interconnected. There needs to be a comprehensive approach to 
solve them in a long-term manner. Otherwise, a failure to meet any of the three challenges would 
bring a halt to progress in the other fields, as has happened repeatedly over the last 15 years. 
The problems facing Russia-EU relations have been discussed in a large number of analytical works, 
so there is no need to focus on them all here. Moreover, this paper is not intended only as an analysis 
of problems inside the EU and in its relations with other European countries. At the same time, these 
problems can offer subjects for political and expert discourse both ‘inside’ and ‘around’ the EU in the 
next few years. Of special importance is the problem of the two sides’ lack of a common strategic 
goal. 
This problem is best illustrated by the strategic documents on bilateral relations, adopted by Russia 
and the European Union in 1999.
10 In those documents, the parties set out their own goals for co-
operation and rapprochement, which differed both in the substance and the ways to achieve these 
goals. The EU, following the paradigm of ‘enlargement’ in different forms, gave top priority to 
Russia’s transformation. Moscow assigned more importance to establishing an equitable dialogue 
between two independent actors of international relations and did not link its co-operation with the EU 
to changes in the Russian economy or society. The lack of a shared strategy of Russia-EU relations 
was the focus of numerous seminars and conferences held in subsequent years outside the framework 
of official top-level dialogue. Following the changes that have taken place in Russia’s domestic policy 
since 2000, the two sides have preferred to avoid this subject completely. They have never formulated 
a common goal for their co-operation and, quite possibly, the crisis in the EU will promote a more in-
depth discussion of this issue. 
High politics 
What changes of a conceptual nature may occur in EU foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis Russia, as 
the EU recovers from the current crisis? There are but a few options, given the EU’s internal 
constraints, decades of experience of integration and external factors.  
By all appearances, European integration will see a slowdown in the EU’s foreign policy as it emerges 
from its crisis. There will need to be some kind of inward-looking analysis to bring the EU closer 
together and improve the quality of transnational European democracy and the authority of the EU 
institutions. In the meantime, it cannot be ruled out that a less self-assured EU will require a 
sufficiently reliable partner who will, at least, neither compete with Europe nor bring economic 
pressure to bear on it. This may be the basis for more trust-building. 
As regards relations with the largest European nation outside the EU, an attempt at a neo-functionalist 
approach – exploring the integration phenomenon in terms of getting new political benefits from 
closer co-operation in purely technological spheres – may turn out to be an exciting intellectual 
exercise. For all its seeming advantages (a rather successful record of the 1950s, relative equality of 
the participants and the easing of normative requirements imposed on them), such a vision of the 
future will hardly ever materialise. In the short term, functional co-operation may indeed be useful to 
some extent at the very basic level but this cooperation will be too meagre for this approach to be 
considered as promising when it comes to the strategy of developing relations. 
The EU’s own record of the past few years goes to show that even in-depth economic integration is 
insufficient for the purposes of diminishing the impact of strictly nationally specific political 
behaviour and motivation in the decision-making process. The dramatic changes the United 
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Kingdom’s ‘European’ policy has undergone over the past 18 to 24 months, just as the EU’s own 
record of the mid-1960s, put it beyond all reasonable doubt that political leadership at the national 
level may have a decisive role to play even in the midst of apparently profound economic integration. 
As far as Russia is concerned, one of the partners lacking economic motivation (a high assessment of 
potential advantages) that made possible the implementation by the EU founding fathers of their 
visionary plans in the 1950s, may, regrettably, be decisive. The partners’ potential contributions are 
hardly comparable except in the sphere of space exploration. Integration in such a narrow field would 
hardly amount to much in political terms. Rather, it may itself fall victim to political circumstances.  
The bottom line is clearly Russian and EU convergence in standards and values. However, this is 
hardly attainable even in the medium term. Given that completely conflicting value systems caused a 
crisis within the European Union, the issue of new countries’ formal association with or accession to 
the EU should be given even more thought.  
The slowing down of the European Union’s rate of expansion (instead of ‘enlargement’) – legal 
expansion, above all – may contribute towards a more sustainable form of co-operation with Russia. 
This co-operation cannot, at this juncture, include elements of integration and will proceed along the 
lines of a search for more equitable forms of understanding each sides’ national priorities as they take 
shape in the course of internal political processes. In that case, co-operation will be particularly 
surefooted. Further attempts at blending ‘pragmatism’ of relations (as declared in the statement to the 
effect that Russia is not going to join the EU) with a pursuit of ‘integration’ expressed in the so-called 
roadmaps is unlikely to be successful. 
In this respect, promoting de facto equality in developing a joint agenda (dominated by the EU’s 
approach until recently) could become a priority in Russia’s relations with EU-centred Europe in the 
wake of the EU crisis. The more so as external international circumstances favour rapprochement 
between Russia and the European Union. 
That could be spurred on by another consequence of the 2005 crisis - a higher standard of internal 
democracy and transparency within the European Union’s decision-making mechanism. Until 
recently, EU policy towards Russia has been shaped by the European Commission largely as an 
extension or a simplified version of plans for co-operation with ‘new neighbour nations’. As a result, 
the gap between the official order of the day and the two sides’ real potentialities grew wider, and 
reviews of bilateral relationships focused on polishing decisions already made at the bureaucratic 
level. Making this process more open to EU member states and representatives of their expert 
community, on the one hand, and to Russian experts, on the other, may lead to more balanced policy 
documents.  
On the whole, since all the three elements of the EU’s crisis can be identified in its relations with 
Russia as well, the answer to these challenges may have a wholesome effect on the future of Greater 
Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok. The possibility of Russia joining the community of nations 
that transfer their sovereign rights to the supranational level is still a distant prospect. Nevertheless, the 
process of EU recovery getting underway following the summer 2005 events may set the stage for 
such truly strategic developments. 
… and low politics 
Apart from the much more vivid discussion about the future of the EU and its external policies, the EU 
crisis may have several far-reaching consequences at the lower and medium levels of European life, 
including Russia-EU relations (low politics). Of them, the most important one will be the beginning of 
a major discussion about internal democracy and democratic legitimacy in the European integration 
process. The discussion of Europe’s future, with this Constitution or another, cannot be conducted 
without the at least intellectual engagement of Russia (Russians), the ‘odd insider(s)’ and the largest 
European country remaining outside the  EU. It would be worth involving Russian experts, public 
figures and businesspeople in European forums, conferences and round-table meetings. A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE | 21 
The EU could also improve the quality of communication between citizens and supranational bodies in 
Brussels. This area can open new opportunities for the EU’s relations with Russia and its non-
governmental actors. In the long term, the direct interaction of supranational EU bodies, businesses 
and societies of the two sides will help create an atmosphere of confidence – something that the 
relations between Russia and the European Union and, perhaps, between the EU countries themselves, 
lack most of all. In the sphere of business, the representation of interests is a major factor of stability 
in the European integration model. The degree of Russian and EU interdependence is so considerable 
that official bodies of the two sides must make efforts to broaden the frameworks and opportunities for 
the representation of business interests in Moscow and Brussels. Lobbying by civil society is no longer 
the preserve of companies alone and it must be supported at the state level. Otherwise, it will continue 
to be replaced with other forms of interest protection. In this individual case, Russia and the European 
Union now need the following: 
  a common legislative base for representing private interests (a special agreement on access to 
government information and participation in preliminary consultations); 
  the allocation of state funds to support the activities of representative offices of business 
associations in Moscow and Brussels; and 
  investment (support) in the training of Russia’s EU experts. 
To sum up, the European Union, which is now in a state of internal difficulty and uncertainty, is a 
major political and economic actor in contemporary Europe. It thus deserves greater attention both in 
terms of expert analysis and consideration as a partner.  
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